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Abstract
Standard models used in academic and institutional research implement the value-added
tax (VAT) as a simple consumption tax levied on consumers, implying that tax changes
instantaneously translate into consumer price changes. This corresponds to immediate tax
pass-though, which is, however, inconsistent with a wealth of empirical evidence for gradual
pass-through. I investigate how empirically plausible pass-through dynamics affect VAT
multipliers in a New-Keynesian DSGE model relative to instantaneous pass-through under
the conventional modeling strategy. To this end, I propose an approach to reconcile pass-
through in the model with empirical estimates, and find that short-run multipliers decline
by about 50% once we account for empirically observed pass-through dynamics. Standard
models thus dramatically overestimate the short-run impact of VAT changes.
JEL classification: E62, E32.
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1 Introduction
The “New View” of fiscal policy (Furman, 2016) refers to the emerging consensus that discre-
tionary fiscal policy is indispensable and can be effective in a world of persistently low interest
rates. The renewed emphasis on fiscal policy is accompanied by a surge in academic and institu-
tional interest (for surveys, see Ramey, 2011; Parker, 2011; Fatás & Mihov, 2009; Hebous, 2011;
Leeper et al., 2015). For fiscal stimulus design and macroeconomic consolidation packages, it is
crucial to have a precise understanding of the size of multipliers associated with different fiscal
instruments. In the context of fiscal stimulus, the relative magnitudes of multipliers tell us which
instrument provides the most “bang for the buck”, and in the context of consolidation they tell
us how a given improvement in the primary balance can be achieved with the smallest possible
reduction in aggregate demand. Among fiscal instruments, the value-added tax (VAT) plays a
prominent role: between 2007 and 2013, 15 EU countries increased the VAT in order to improve
public finances (see Benedek et al., 2015). Japan plans to increase the VAT by 2% in 2019. This
gives VAT multipliers a central political relevance, especially in light of high levels of public debt
in many developed countries. VAT reductions are also used to stimulate spending, as was done
with the 2.5% reduction in the UK in 2010. As of 2014, 160 countries employ a VAT, including
all OECD member countries except the US.1
As an indirect tax, the VAT on final products is not paid to the government by consumers
but by the respective sellers, as e.g. retail stores or service providers. Since consumer prices
in countries with a European-style VAT are typically quoted inclusive of the VAT liability, tax
changes affect consumers only to the extent that they are passed on via price adjustments.
Consistent with the notion of nominal rigidity, there is a wealth of empirical evidence reporting
that pass-through of changes in the VAT is only gradual. For example, the comprehensive IMF
study of Benedek et al. (2015) strongly rejects full contemporaneous pass-through in a sample
of all VAT reforms in the Eurozone between 1999 and 2013: “The null of full pass-through is
firmly rejected, with the point estimates implying that only around one-third of a VAT change is
passed forward to consumer prices”. They conclude “[s]imply assuming full pass-through of all
VAT reforms is, it seems, a significant mistake”.
The conventional way of implementing the VAT in macroeconomic models is to use a simple
ad valorem consumption tax levied on consumers, which implicitly assumes instantaneous tax
pass-through. Consider IMF’s workhorse DSGE model GIMF as an example. The household’s
consumption tax liability is given by PCt ctτc,t, with PCt denoting the price index, ct consumption
and τc,t the tax rate (see Kumhof et al., 2010, p. 9). The tax liability per unit of consumption
PCt τc,t moves contemporaneously and proportionally with τc,t, so if PCt was constant, a change
in the tax liability would be fully paid by consumers. Sellers only pay a share of a tax change to
the extent that there is a general equilibrium adjustment in PCt , i.e. that prices decline (increase)
in the face of higher (lower) taxes. However, PCt is virtually constant in the short-run after a tax
change, because standard models feature price and wage rigidity that delay general equilibrium
price adjustments.2 Changes in the tax liability are thus effectively paid by consumers in the
short run, which corresponds to full instantaneous pass-through of VAT changes.
Despite the inconsistency between gradual pass-through in the data and instantaneous model
1Source: OECD Consumption Tax Trends, 2014.
2Anderson et al. (2013a) p.27 shows price adjustments in GIMF to a permanent fiscal consolidation in the size
of 1% of GDP, implemented by higher consumption taxes. Prices decline by about 0.03% in the first year and
by roughly 0.06% (0.08%) in the second (third) year after the tax hike started. Coenen et al. (2010) study the
impact of fiscal stimulus in four different structural models. Without monetary accommodation, annual inflation
in response to a two-year 1%-GDP decrease in consumption taxes is is below 0.05% in the QUEST model, in the
GIMF model, and in ECB’s NAWM model (p.106).
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pass-through under the conventional modeling strategy,3 the latter is adopted in both academic
and institutional research. Examples of academic papers papers include Papageorgiou (2012),
Coenen et al. (2013) and Coenen et al. (2012) on fiscal policy in Europe, Lipinska & Von Thadden
(2012), Hohberger & Kraus (2016) and Engler et al. (forthcoming) on Fiscal Devaluations,
and Eggertsson & Woodford (2004) on the liquidity trap in Japan. Leading policy-making
institutions extensively draw on large-scale DSGE models to derive policy advice on the design
of discretionary fiscal policy. There is a host of applications of the ECB’s New Area-Wide
and EAGLE models, the European Commission’s QUEST model, the IMF’s GIMF and FSGM
models and the OECD’s Fiscal model4 which analyze fiscal policy using the respective model’s
consumption tax to represent a VAT.5
To investigate how empirically plausible pass-through dynamics affect VAT multipliers rel-
ative to instantaneous pass-through under the conventional modeling approach, I develop a
New-Keynesian DSGE model which features a consumption tax as well as a VAT. The consump-
tion tax is levied on households and represents the conventional implementation of the VAT in
standard models. For the VAT, I develop a modeling strategy to reconcile tax pass-through
in the model with empirical estimates. The impact on output of changes in the two taxes is
simulated and the resulting multipliers are compared. Since consumption tax multipliers provide
a reference point for the impact of VAT changes under the conventional modeling approach,
their differences to VAT multipliers can be interpreted as bias introduced by the conventional
VAT-implementation. Short-run multipliers obtained for the consumption tax are dramatically
larger than those obtained for the VAT. For example, increasing tax revenues by 1% of GDP
for five years causes an average first-year GDP decline of 0.14% (0.06%) if it is achieved by
increasing the consumption tax (the VAT). Hence, by neglecting to account for plausible VAT
pass-through dynamics, standard models overestimate the short-run impact of VAT changes.
Gradual pass-through dampens the impact of tax changes because intertemporal optimization
leads agents to cut back spending when consumer prices rise, which happens instantaneously if
the VAT is represented by a consumption tax, but only gradually if the tax hike transmits to
consumer prices in line with empirical estimates.
The main contribution of this paper is to draw attention to the unsatisfactory implementation
of the VAT in standard models. This is especially relevant in the context of institutional research
because the results suggest that a substantial body of policy advice suffers from overestimation
of short-run VAT multipliers. While this issue is mentioned (but not addressed) in Eggertsson
(2011), I propose a modeling strategy to reconcile VAT pass-through with empirical evidence and
quantify the bias in VAT multipliers introduced by the conventional implementation. Improving
the accuracy of VAT multipliers obtained from theoretical models allows for more meaningful
policy advice, especially because it can be crucial for the ordering of different fiscal instruments
with regard to their suitability for some discretionary fiscal policy. My results also suggest
3A consumption tax is suitable to represent the US-style sales tax, because pass-through of the sales tax is
reported to be swift and comprehensive (see for example Poterba, 1996; Besley & Rosen, 1998). This is compatible
with nominal rigidity because retail prices are quoted exclusive of the tax liability in the US.
4For model derivations, see Christoffel et al. (2008) for the New Area-Wide model, Gomes et al. (2010) for
the EAGLE model, Ratto et al. (2009) for the QUEST model, Kumhof et al. (2010) for the GIMF model, Andrle
et al. (2015) for the FSGM model and Furceri & Mourougane (2010) for the OECD Fiscal model.
5For papers using GIMF, see IMF (2014b) (on fiscal devaluation in Spain), IMF (2014a) (on fiscal multipliers
in Denmark), IMF (2013) (on fiscal consolidation in Hungary), Snudden & Klyuev (2011) (on fiscal consolidation
in the Czech Republic), Anderson et al. (2013b) (on fiscal consolidation in various Euro Area countries) and IMF
(2015) (on the impact of VAT hikes in Iceland). Arbatli et al. (2016) apply the recent FSGM model for Japan
(that has a VAT). For ECB publications see Coenen et al. (2008) (monthly bulletin on fiscal consolation), and
Barrell et al. (2014) as well as ECB (2014) on multipliers. For the European Commission’s QUEST model, see
for example in’t Veld (2013), Roeger & in’t Veld (2010), and Giudice et al. (2003). Furceri & Mourougane (2010)
applies OECD Fiscal to analyze the effects of fiscal policy in the euro area.
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that the introduction of realistic VAT pass-through dynamics could overturn the findings of
the theoretical literature on the effectiveness of Fiscal Devaluations, in which the VAT is also
represented by a consumption tax. This paper’s results are also policy-relevant to the extent
that policymakers can influence VAT pass-through dynamics. Benedek et al. (2015) report
that pass-through for reduced VAT rates is considerably slower than for the standard rate. The
latter rate thus appears more suitable for fiscal stimulus, as faster pass-through leads to a quicker
consumption increase. By the same token, reduced rates are better suited for fiscal consolidation,
as the adverse impact on GDP is delayed.
Section 2 of this paper summarizes empirical evidence on VAT pass-through and Section
3 presents the model and its calibration. Section 4 provides economic intuition for the results
presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses policy implications and Section 7 provides a robustness
analysis. The paper concludes with Section 8.
2 Evidence on tax pass-through
The European-style VAT taxes the value added at each stage of the supply chain (see, for
example, the textbook Wendler et al. (2008)). Each seller on the chain charges the VAT to the
buyer and pays it to the government. At the same time, all buyers other than the end consumer
are entitled to refund the VAT liability that accrued for the purchase of intermediate goods used
in the production (final goods in the case of retailers). The tax liability for each business on
the supply chain is thus a fraction of the difference between its revenues and its expenses for
upstream products. Since the end consumer is charged the VAT for the final product but is
not entitled for a refund, she or he ends up paying the total VAT liability.6 For the US-style
sales tax, it also holds that ultimately only the end consumer is taxed. However, its collection
procedure is simpler. Here, only the business that sells the final product to the end consumer
charges the sales tax and pays it to the government.
Empirical evidence on VAT pass-through can be divided into studies that focus on a narrow
set of goods and studies that investigate the impact of VAT changes on the CPI. Beginning with
the former, Kosonen (2013) reports that a decline in the VAT on hairdressing services in Finland
led to price reductions of only half of what full pass-through would imply. Carbonnier (2007)
examines a reduction of the VAT on car sales and on housing repair services in France. In both
cases, the pass-through was swift (during the first four months) but incomplete. For housing
repair services, the consumer share of the tax reduction was estimated to be 77% and 57% for car
sales. Politi & Mattos (2011) investigate VAT pass-through for ten different food items in Brazil.
In their baseline specification, full pass-through is rejected for all items, with point estimates
ranging from 55% for rice to 26% for bread. Regarding the second type of studies, the IMF
publication Carare & Danninger (2008) looks at the 3% VAT hike in Germany in 2007. They
report a cumulative pass-through of 73% over a time period of two years: one third occurred
in the year preceding the reform due to anticipation effects, and the remaining two thirds took
place in the implementation year. Various papers study the 13-month VAT reduction starting
in December 2008 in the UK. Pike et al. (2009) estimate a pass-through of only a half, while
Chirakijja et al. (2009) report substantial and rapid pass-through, with a point estimate of 75%.
The Bank of England assumes that around half of the tax cut is passed on to consumers in the
course of the 13-month reduction (Bank of England Inflation Reports for February 2009 (p.31)
and for August 2010 (p.32)).
The most comprehensive study on VAT pass-through in Europe is the IMF study Benedek
6This paragraph takes a long-run perspective, in which all prices have adjusted such that every firm passes on
its tax liability to the respective buyer.
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et al. (2015). The authors use a dataset that ranges from 1999 to 2013 and covers monthly price
and tax data for 67 consumption items and 1231 VAT changes in total. To isolate the impact of a
VAT change on the consumer price of a commodity, the study uses as control variables the prices
of the same commodity sold in countries other than the one in which the tax change occurs.
Benedek et al. (2015) strongly reject full contemporaneous pass-through for the average VAT
change. Because of the high statistical power of the dataset and its unmatched completeness,
this study serves as the calibration target for VAT pass-through in the model. It is discussed in
more detail in the context of the calibration in Section 3.8.
3 Model
In the following DSGE framework, the small open economy under consideration belongs to a
monetary union and represents a typical country of Europe’s distressed periphery, in which fiscal
consolidation is highly relevant. The home country trades with the rest of the union (henceforth
“RoU”), but RoU-countries are not affected by developments in the home country (apart from
adjusting imports according to the terms of trade). Domestic households trade non-contingent
bonds with RoU-households. In the baseline model, the home country has a negligible weight in
the union-wide inflation measure stabilized by the central bank. Intermediate good prices and
wages can only be adjusted in a staggered fashion. A government levies taxes and has constant
government consumption defined as plain waste. The only non-standard component of the model
is a retail firm sector which distributes the final good to households.7
We study two versions of the model. In the “European VAT model”, the government exclu-
sively levies a VAT whose pass-through dynamics are consistent with empirical evidence. In the
“consumption tax model”, the government only levies a consumption tax on households, so tax
changes directly affect consumer prices. Consumption tax multipliers are broadly in line with
the institutions’ workhorse models.8 The purpose of this model version is to provide a reference
point for the impact of VAT changes under the conventional modeling approach, when the con-
sumption tax represents a VAT. The two models have identical steady states because they differ
only in the speed of pass-through of changes in the tax liability (tax incidence is the same in the
long run).9 Differences between multipliers computed in subsequent sections can thus be fully
attributed to different pass-through dynamics.
3.1 Households
Households on the continuum [0, 1] are indexed by j. The index is neglected for the most part
to ease notation. A household’s lifetime utility is given by
Ut = Et
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
c1−γt+k
1− γ −
n1+φt+k
1 + φ
)
, (1)
where nt+k and ct+k are hours worked and consumption in period t+ k.
7The model shares its basic features with workhorse models used at policy-making institutions. This way,
differences between the impact of changes in the two taxes provide an indication for how the introduction of
realistic VAT pass-through would affect multipliers in the institutions’ workhorse models.
8As shown in Section 5, the first-year consumption tax multiplier is 0.15%. In contrast, Coenen et al. (2010)
report that the GIMF, QUEST and NAWM models generate multipliers in the range of 0.25%-0.33% for the euro
area as a whole. The model at hand produces a smaller multiplier because it represents an individual country and
thus has a steady state trade share roughly twice as large as in Coenen et al. (2010). In addition, rule-of-thumb
consumers are only considered as a robustness exercise.
9Pass-through dynamics in either version are illustrated and explained in Section 3.8.
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The household faces the following series of period budget constraints for t ≥ 0:
(1+τ ct )Ptct+at+bt ≤ (Rt−1−RPt−1)at−1 +(Rt−1−RPt−1)bt−1 +wt(j)Nt (j)+Πt−Tt , (2)
where Pt denotes the retail price index, and ct is the final consumption bundle, both introduced
below. τ ct is the tax rate of the consumption tax, which is implemented as in the institutions’
models. It is set to zero in the European VAT model. Rt − RPt is the gross nominal interest
rate (including a risk premium introduced below), and at as well as bt are one-period risk-free
nominal bonds. at is issued by the domestic government, and bt denotes bonds traded with
RoU-households. Both bonds mature at the beginning of period t + 1. wt(j)Nt (j) is nominal
labor income, corresponding to the product of the household-specific wage wt(j) (which it earns
for its work at all intermediate good firms i ∈ [0, 1] on the continuum) and its total employment,
defined as Nt (j) =
∫ 1
0 nt (i, j) di. Tt are lump-sum taxes levied by the government, and Πt
denotes nominal profits from the ownership of firms (including retail firms introduced below).
Intertemporal optimization leads to the following Euler equation:
Rt −RPt = βEt
(
ct
ct+1
)γ
Pt
Pt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
. (3)
RPt = −φBBt is a risk premium proposed by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003), with Bt =∫ 1
0 bt (j) dj denoting aggregate bond holdings. It forces external debt to return asymptotically to
the steady state level of zero after a shock, which ensures stationarity of the model. However,
φB is so small that the risk premium can be neglected in the short and medium term shock
adjustment, and thus does not affect the results of this paper.
Hours worked are determined by labor demand. As discussed below, workers reduce their
labor supply below the competitive level because they have market power.
The final consumption bundle ct consists of retail good varieties from all retail firms on
the continuum (indexed by r ∈ [0, 1]). Varieties of different retail firms crett (r) are imperfect
substitutes for households and are bundled with the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
ct =
[∫ 1
0
(
crett (r)
) r−1
r dr
] r
r−1
. (4)
Cost minimization implies a standard demand schedule for retail firm varieties:
crett (r) =
(
prett (r)
Pt
)−r
ct , (5)
where prett (r) is the price of retail variety r and Pt the retail price index, given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
(
prett (r)
)1−r
dr
) 11−r
. (6)
3.2 Supply side
Intermediate good firms produce differentiated intermediate good varieties, which are sold do-
mestically and exported to the RoU. A competitive final good firm bundles domestic intermediate
goods as well as imports into a final good. In contrast to the standard model, the final good is
not sold to households directly, but distributed by a continuum of retail firms. These firms have
market power because they repackage the final good into differentiated retail firm varieties that
6
are imperfect substitutes in (4). Retail firms pay the European VAT to the government in the
respective version of the model.10 Figure 1 summarizes the supply side (neglecting government
consumption). Arrows denote the flow of goods and the respective price levels.
Exports
Dom.
sales
Imports
from
RoU
Exports 
to RoU
Imports
Dom.
goods
𝑌𝑡
𝐻,𝑅𝑜𝑈 at
price 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝐻 at price 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑜𝑈 at
price 𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑜𝑈
𝐶𝑡 at price
𝑃𝑡 = (1 + 𝜉𝑡)𝑃𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛
price 𝑃𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛
Intermediate 
good firms
produce good
varieties
Final good firm
bundles domestic 
good varieties
with imports 
Retail firms
distribute final good and
pay VAT in respective
model version
Consumers
𝑌𝑡 at 
Figure 1: Supply side of the model economy.
3.2.1 Intermediate good producers
Intermediate good firm i ∈ [0, 1] produces its variety yt(i) with a linear production function:
yt (i) = nt (i) . (7)
The input is a labor composite nt(i) that contains differentiated labor services nt(i, j) of all
households j ∈ [0, 1]:
nt (i) ≡
(∫ 1
0
nt (i, j)1−
1
w dj
) w
w−1
. (8)
Cost-minimizing composition of nt(i) implies the following demand schedule for type-j labor:
nt (i, j) =
(
wt (j)
Wt
)−w
nt (i) , (9)
where wt(j) is the wage for type-j labor and Wt is the aggregate wage index:
Wt ≡
(∫ 1
0
wt (j)1−w dj
) 11−w
. (10)
Using (9) and (10), firm i’s total wage bill can be expressed as:∫ 1
0
wt (j)nt (i, j) dj = Wtnt (i) . (11)
10The shortcut of levying the VAT only on retailers is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
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Demand for firm i’s variety stems from domestic private and government consumption and,
via exports, from consumption in the RoU. All buyers of the variety use the same aggregation
technology as the final good firm (governed by (17) below). Consequently, cost minimization
implies the following demand schedule:
yt (i) =
(
pintt (i)
P intt
)−
Y totalt , (12)
where pintt (i) is the price of firm i’s variety, and Y totalt denotes aggregate demand for domestic
goods, given by (35) below. P intt is the price index for intermediate goods, defined by
P intt ≡
(∫ 1
0
pintt (i)
1−
di
) 11−
. (13)
Only a random share (1− θ) of firms is allowed to re-adjust prices in a given period. A firm
that is allowed to re-adjust its price solves the following problem:
max
pintt (i)
Et
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kθ
k
[
yt+k|t (i) pintt (i)−Ψt+k
(
yt+k|t (i)
)]
, (14)
where yt+k|t (i) is period t+ k output (determined by (12)), given that the price set in t remains
valid up to period t+ k. The stochastic discount factor (SDF) is
Qt,t+k ≡ βk (ct+k/ct)−γ
(
Pt (1 + τ ct ) /Pt+k
(
1 + τ ct+k
))
. The cost function Ψt (.) represents the
firm’s total wage bill (11), which, using (7), can be written as:
Ψt+k
(
yt+k|t (i)
)
= Wt+kyt+k|t . (15)
The optimal price (pintt )∗ set by re-adjusting firms is governed by the following FOC:
Et
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kθ
kyt+k|t
[
(pintt )∗ −

(− 1)Wt+k
]
= 0 . (16)
(pintt )∗ is a markup over a weighted average of expected effective marginal costs, which are equal
to the wage rate.
One possible modeling strategy to generate gradual VAT pass-through is to levy the tax on
intermediate good firms. In this case, the FOC would schedule that after-tax revenues (price
divided by tax factor) are a markup over marginal costs, and a change in the tax liability would
affect firm profits until prices can be adjusted in order to pass it on to consumers. However,
this modeling strategy is inconsistent with the destination-based nature of the VAT. In reality
the VAT is reimbursed on exports, so it is not reasonable to assume that foreign prices are
adjusted in order to roll over changes in the domestic VAT liability. Unless the model featured
a second pricing equation for the foreign market (i.e. a pricing-to-market strategy), this would
nevertheless happen if the FOC accounted for after-tax revenues.
3.2.2 Final good producer
In a first step, the competitive final good firm bundles domestic intermediate goods {yt (i)} into
the domestic goods bundle Y Ht . In a second step, it bundles Y Ht with the foreign goods bundle
Y RoUt into the final consumption good that is distributed via the retail sector. The aggregation
technology for the first step is given by
Y Ht ≡
(∫ 1
0
yt (i)1−
1
 di
) 
−1
. (17)
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Bundling of Y Ht with the foreign goods bundle Y RoUt is subject to consumption home bias.
The final good Yt is packed with the following technology:
Yt =
(
(1− ω) 1σ (Y Ht )σ−1σ + ω 1σ (Y RoUt )σ−1σ ) σ1−σ , (18)
where ω reflects home bias in consumption, and σ determines the elasticity of substitution
between domestic goods and goods from the RoU.
The price of the final good P fint is given by:
P fint =
(
(1− ω) (P intt )1−σ + ω (PRoUt )1−σ) 11−σ , (19)
where PRoUt is the price index for the foreign goods bundle.11 Cost-efficient bundling of Yt
implies the following demand schedule for the domestic intermediate goods bundle:12
Y Ht = (1− ω)
(
P intt
P fint
)−σ
Yt . (20)
Since the terms of trade are one in the steady state of the model, the steady state import share
is given by ω. Profits made by intermediate firms are discussed in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.3 Retailers
A retail firm r ∈ [0, 1] buys the final good at price P fint and sells it to households with a
firm-specific markup ξt(r), so its price prett (r) is given by
prett (r) = (1 + ξt(r))P
fin
t . (21)
In the European VAT model, retailers pay a tax-inclusive13 VAT rate of τvt (set to zero in the
consumption tax model). They thus only receive after-tax revenues of prett /(1+τvt ) per unit. This
accounts for the destination-based nature of the VAT. It is paid on imports, since imports are
part of the final good bundle sold by retailers, but not paid on exports, since the VAT exclusively
affect retailers who only sell to the domestic market.
Substituting (21) in (6) yields Pt =
(∫ 1
0 (1 + ξt(r))
1−rdr
) 1
1−r
P fint . Defining
(1 + ξt) ≡
(∫ 1
0
(1 + ξt(r))1−rdr
) 11−r
(22)
as the aggregate markup factor, the retail price index can be written as
Pt = (1 + ξt)P fint . (23)
Retailers choose their markups subject to a Calvo constraint: in each period, they are only
allowed to re-adjust ξt(r) with a probability 0 < 1−θr < 1. When deciding on ξt(r), re-adjusting
retailers solve the following problem:
max
ξt
Et
∞∑
k=0
(θr)kQt,t+kyrett+k|t
[
prett+k|t
1 + τvt+k
− P fint+k
]
. (24)
11Foreign prices are constant and assumed to equal domestic prices in the steady state.
12Demand for the foreign goods bundle is not shown because it has no relevance in a small open economy model.
13For a tax-inclusive rate, the tax liability is included in the tax base.
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Because retail firms are owned by households, Qt,t+k discounts future profits.14 yrett+k|t is period
t+ k demand for retailers that have not adjusted their markup since t and therefore still charge
the price prett+k|t = (1+ξt+k|t)P
fin
t+k . It is determined by demand schedule (5). The square bracket
denotes profits, as it subtracts expenses P fint+k from period t+k after-tax revenues prett+k|t/(1+τvt+k).
Using (21) and (23) in (5), yrett+k|t can be written as yrett+k|t =
(
1+ξt+k|t
1+ξt+k
)−r
Ct+k, where
Ct ≡
∫ 1
0 ct (j) dj denotes aggregate consumption. Substituting y
ret
t+k|t in (24) leads to the following
FOC for newly set markups ξ∗t :
Et
∞∑
k=0
(θr)kQt,t+kCt+kP fint+k (1 + ξt+k)
r
[
1 + ξ∗t
1 + τvt+k
− r
r − 1
]
= 0 . (25)
The FOC implies that retailers charge a markup over their expenses for the final good, and,
in the European VAT model, also roll over the tax liability to consumers in the long run. In
the steady state, all firms have adjusted markups and charge ξ∗, so it holds that (1 + ξ∗) =
(1 + ξ) = rr−1 (1 + τ
v). If retail varieties were perfect substitutes (r → ∞), the aggregate
markup would equal the tax rate, so retailers would roll over the full tax liability and thus break
even.15 However, since retailers have market power ( rr−1 > 1), they charge a higher price and
therefore make profits in the steady state. These profits deviate from their steady state value in
the short run when τvt is shocked in the European VAT model. A change in τvt directly affects
after-tax revenues, so if a retailer is not allowed to re-adjust its markup, the change in the tax
liability fully falls on its profits. It is passed on to consumers only when the retailer is allowed to
re-adjust. This means that the aggregate pass-through of a change in the tax liability depends on
the share of retailers that adjusted markups in response. Since θr < 1, the immediate aggregate
pass-through is incomplete, and the value of θr determines the delay until full pass-through on
the part of retail firms is achieved.
Under τvt = 0 in the consumption tax model, all retailers charge the constant markup rr−1
reflecting their market power. For fully flexible retail markups θr = 0 (a hypothetical case to
illustrate the workings of the model), the European VAT model is equivalent to the consumption
tax model. In this case retailers instantaneously pass on changes in the tax liability, so the
adjustment of consumer prices is equivalent to their adjustment to a consumption tax change
(for which changes in the tax liability immediately affect consumer prices).
Relative to the alternative modeling strategy of levying the tax on intermediate good firms
that follow a pricing-to-market strategy (see Section 3.2.1), this modeling choice has the ad-
vantage that pass-through dynamics can be varied while all other adjustment properties of the
model are held constant. Changing θr only affects VAT pass-through dynamics, while changing
θ under the alternative modeling strategy would at the same time also alter general inflation
dynamics.
The evolution of the aggregate markup factor ξt over time is determined in a way that is
familiar from standard Calvo pricing. The fraction (1 − θr) of re-adjusting retailers charge ξ∗t ,
while the distribution of markups among non-adjusting retailers is the same as in the previous
14In the baseline calibration, retailers discount future profits in the same way as households, which is consistent
with their ownership of these firms. Section 5 also considers different discount factors of retails firms (βr), in
which case the SDF reads as Qt,t+k ≡ (βr)k (ct+k/ct)−γ
(
Pt
(
1 + τct
)
/Pt+k
(
1 + τct+k
))
. This allows to study a
broader set of pass-through dynamics, but comes at the cost of the inconsistency that retail firms use a different
discount factor than their owners. However, apart from affecting pass-through dynamics, this has no further
implications for the model’s adjustment properties.
15After-tax revenues per unit p
ret
t (r)
1+τv
t
= 1+ξt(r)1+τv
t
P fint then equal P
fin
t , which are the expenses for one unit of
the final good.
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period. It follows that (22) can be written as
1 + ξt =
(∫
S(t)
(1 + ξt−1 (r))1−r dr + (1− θr) (1 + ξ∗t )1−r
) 1
1−r
, (26)
where S(t) denotes the set of non-adjusting retailers (which has a mass of θr). Using (22) for
t− 1, the equation can be written as
1 + ξt =
(
θr (1 + ξt−1)1−r + (1− θr) (1 + ξ∗t )1−r
) 1
1−r (27)
which (jointly with (25)) governs the evolution of the aggregate retail markup factor (1 + ξt).
Discussion of the modeling strategy
Assuming that only retail firms pay VAT is at odds with the collection scheme outlined in Section
2. In a more realistic setup, intermediate good firms would charge VAT to the final good firm,
which would charge VAT to retail firms, which in turn would charge the VAT to consumers (the
final good firm and retail firms would also receive tax refunds). The model at hand only accounts
for taxation at the final link of the supply chain (i.e. retailers charging VAT to consumers), but
abstracts from taxation at all other segments of the chain. As argued in the following, the model
is nevertheless well suited to study VAT multipliers, because all channels by which VAT changes
affect output are either thoroughly calibrated or operate in the same way as under a realistic
collection scheme.
First, for the consumption decision of households, only pass-through at the final link of
the supply chain matters, because it is only then that tax changes affect consumer prices.16
Pass-through dynamics at this link are thoroughly calibrated, since the rigidity of the aggregate
retail markup ξt is chosen such that the “final” pass-through of tax changes to consumer prices
corresponds to empirical evidence (see section 3.8 below). Note that empirical studies on VAT
pass-through also measure pass-through of tax changes to consumer prices, and thus constitute
a valid empirical counterpart to pass-through in the model.
Second, we consider profits and household income. Levying VAT exclusively on retail firms
means that only their profits are affected by VAT changes. Under a realistic collection scheme, in
contrast, profits of all firms along the supply chain would be affected, since all firms pay VAT.17
Household income is the same in both cases because the representative household owns all firms
(see Section 3.2.4), so her or his income is independent of the distribution of after-tax profits
across the different types of firms. A stringent modeling of the collection scheme would thus
imply the same household income as the model at hand.18
Third, expenditure switching effects only depend on the adjustment of intermediate good
prices, because the VAT is destination-based tax19 and therefore does not matter for the terms
16The household’s intertemporal substitution decision depends on the adjustment of the real interest rate via
Euler equation (3). The real rate is fully determined by consumer price changes, since they also determine the
nominal interest rate in Taylor rule (36). Thus only the impact of VAT changes on consumer prices is relevant
in the Euler equation, while the impact of VAT changes on prices of upstream products is of no consequence for
the consumption decision.
17Under a realistic collection scheme, all types of firms would pay a portion of total VAT revenues to the
government. Thus, prior to any price adjustments, a change in the total tax liability would be split among
intermediate good firms, the final good firm, and retailers. Price adjustments would then cause the tax liability
to be passed on downwards the supply chain to the consumer.
18Even if household income was different under a realistic collection scheme, this would not affect the consump-
tion adjustment to VAT changes because Ricardian Equivalence holds.
19The domestic VAT applies on imports and on domestic goods, while a foreign VAT applies on exports to the
respective country as well as on goods produced and sold in that country. A country’s VAT thus applies regardless
of a good’s origin and does therefore not affect relative prices between imports and domestic goods.
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of trade. This is accounted for in the model because VAT plays no role for the quantity of imports
relative to domestic goods (see Section 3.2.2 on the final good firm, which bundles foreign and
domestic goods), and because VAT does not matter for export demand (see the foreign portion
in the total demand equation (35)). Plausible expenditure switching effects thus only require
plausible adjustment dynamics of intermediate good prices. The latter are governed by θ, which
is has a standard value that is in line with micro-evidence.
3.2.4 Profits
Profits of retailers and intermediate good firms are pooled and paid out to households. Aggregate
profits Πt are given by
Πt = P intt Y totalt −WtNt +
[
(1 + ξt)P fint
1 + τvt
− P fint
]
Ct , (28)
where Nt is aggregate employment defined as Nt =
∫ 1
0 nt (i) di, and Y
total
t is given by (35) below.
Subtracting the aggregate wage bill from aggregate revenues of intermediate good firms (the first
two terms) yields total profits in that sector. The third term denotes profits in the retail sector:
the square bracket represents average profits per unit sold (after-tax revenues minus expenses to
buy one unit of the final good) and is multiplied by total consumption.
3.3 Unions and wage setting
Nominal wage rigidity is modeled as in Erceg et al. (2000).20 Households exert market power
on the labor market because differentiated labor services are imperfect substitutes in (8). Each
household j is represented by its own labor union that sets the household-specific wage rate
wt (j) subject to a Calvo constraint, so each period only a random share 1 − θw of unions can
re-adjust.
Aggregating demand equation (9) over all intermediate good firms yields∫ 1
0
nt (i, j) di =
∫ 1
0
(
wt (j)
Wt
)−w
nt (i) di (29)
which, using the definition for total type-j labor Nt(j) (see (2)) and the definition of aggregate
employment, can be written as:
Nt (j) =
∫ 1
0
(
wt (j)
Wt
)−w
Nt . (30)
A union maximizes the expected present value of the household it represents, which is gov-
erned by
max
wt(j)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθw)k U
(
ct+k|t (j) , nt+k|t (j)
)]
, (31)
where ct+k|t (j) and nt+k|t (j) are period t + k consumption and hours, given that the newly
set wage is still valid. Maximization is subject to demand schedule (30). The optimal wage w∗t
20Wage rigidity is a standard feature in the institutions’ models and matters for the short-run pass-through of
tax changes because it affects producer price dynamics. It is included to bring the implicit pass-through of the
consumption tax in line with the institutions’ models. Flexible wages are considered as a robustness exercise.
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satisfies the following FOC that (jointly with (10)) governs the evolution of aggregate wages:
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)kMUt+k|tnt+k|t
[
w∗t
(1 + τ ct )Pt+k
− w
w − 1MRSt+k|t
]
= 0 , (32)
where nt+k|t = (w∗t /Wt+k)
−w Nt+k is period t+ k total demand for type-j labor, provided that
w∗t is still valid. MUt+k|t and MRSt+k|t denote household j’s period t+ k marginal utility and
marginal rate of substitution, also conditional on w∗t . For w∗t , it holds that after-tax real wages
are a markup over an expected weighted average of marginal rates of substitution.
3.4 Government
Government consumption G is constant and defined as plain waste. It consists of domestic
intermediate goods, aggregated by the same technology as in (17). The government issues bonds
to domestic households, and At =
∫ 1
0 at (j) dj denotes aggregate bond holdings. The period
budget (for all t ≥ 0) reads as
P intt G+Rt−1At−1 = At + Tt + τ ct PtCt +
τvt
1 + τvt
PtCt , (33)
where P intt G are consumption expenditures (the government does not pay taxes and is not de-
pendent on the retail sector). The last two terms on the RHS are revenues from the consumption
tax and from the European VAT. Depending on the model version, one of the exogenous tax
rates τ ct and τvt is set to zero, so revenues only stem from one source. The non-zero tax rate is
calibrated such that revenues equal expenditures in the zero-debt steady state21 and subjected
to a shocks that represents discretionary fiscal policy.
Lump-sum taxes Tt are introduced as technical device to make At stationary. Tt depends
positively on the government’s indebtedness:
Tt = φAAt . (34)
The responsiveness parameter is set to φA = 0.0125, which is marginally larger than the (quar-
terly) steady state interest rate. Consequently, Tt only reacts very mildly to deviations of At
from zero, but forces At to asymptotically revert to its steady state value of zero after a shock.22
The public sector is highly stylized23, but rich enough to obtain consumption tax and VAT
multipliers from a fiscal consolidation. In either model version, the respective tax rate is shocked
such that revenues increase by 1% of steady state GDP. The induced surplus leads to an accu-
mulation of government assets (At < 0), because G is constant and Tt is effectively constant (in
the short and medium term) due to the small value of φA. Note that the obtained multipliers
would be the same for a debt-financed fiscal stimulus because the model is symmetric in its
approximation around the steady state.
21Allowing for steady state government debt would only affect the model’s adjustment properties (and thereby
the results) if it significantly affected the real allocation in the steady state. However, steady state interest
payments to households would not affect the real allocation if they were financed by lump-sum taxes. If they
were financed by distortionary taxes, they would mildly affect the steady state allocation, but not enough to
significantly change the model’s adjustment properties.
22If φA were equal to the steady state interest rate, Tt would balance interest payments (revenues) for a given
deviation At > 0 (At < 0). At would thus have unit root. A marginally higher value of φA ensures that Tt
increases by enough to also redeem a positive fraction of the principle in the case of At > 0. Vice versa, in the
case of At < 0, Tt declines by enough to pay out a positive fraction of the principle as lump-sum transfer.
23A more realistic public sector that also features labor taxes is considered as robustness exercise in Section 7.
It does not significantly change the results.
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3.5 Aggregate demand
Demand for the domestic goods bundle stems from domestic consumption (Y Ht in (20)), gov-
ernment consumption, and exports. Assuming market clearing for final goods (Yt = Ct), it is
governed by
Y totalt = (1− ω)
(
P intt
P fint
)−σ
Ct + ωRoU
(
P intt
P fin,RoU
)−σ
CRoU +G , (35)
where the second term is export demand. The price of the foreign final good in the RoU
(P fin,RoU ) as well as RoU consumption (CRoU ) are constant and equal to the steady state
values of the respective variables in the home country. The home bias parameter in the RoU
(ωRoU ) is the same as in the home country, which implies balanced trade in the steady state.
3.6 Monetary policy
Monetary policy targets zero union-wide average inflation. It is described by the following
standard Taylor Rule:
Rt = β−1
[
n (pit − 1) + (1− n)
(
piRoUt − 1
)]αpi
, (36)
where αpi governs the responsiveness of monetary policy and n is the weight of the home country
in the monetary union. n is set on a negligibly small value in the baseline calibration, so the
nominal rate is virtually constant. This corresponds to the current monetary policy environment
in the Eurozone – policy rates can effectively not be lowered further and are not expected to
increase in the face of an overall depressed economy. A robustness exercise in Section 7 considers
“normal times” and calibrate n to match HICP country weights of highly indebted Eurozone
countries. The domestic inflation measure pit = (1 + τ ct )Pt/
(
1 + τ ct−1
)
Pt−1 accounts for tax-
inclusive consumers prices. piRoUt = 1 ∀ t is inflation in the RoU.
3.7 Calibration
Table 1 shows the baseline calibration of the quarterly model. It largely follows Evers (2012)
who calibrates a related model to members of the EMU. Calvo probabilities for prices and wages
correspond to the empirical findings of Druant et al. (2009), who report for the Euro Area an
average lifetime of prices and wages of 9.6 and 12.5 months respectively (excluding the outlier
Italy). Elasticities of substitution between different good varieties and labor types match 11%
price markup and 15% wage markup, as estimated in Basu & Kimball (1997) and Chari et al.
(2002). The steady state import share is 0.33 as in Evers (2012).
The steady state tax rate in the European VAT model τv is set to 20%, which Lipinska &
Von Thadden (2012) report to be the Eurozone average. In the consumption tax model, the
steady state tax rate τ c is 21.3%, which leads to the same revenues (so the steady state is the
same in both model versions).24 Government consumption G = 0.165 (corresponding about 18%
24The European VAT rate is defined as a tax-inclusive rate, so the effective tax rate is 20%/ (1 + 20%) = 16.67%,
which is way below the effective consumption tax rate of 21.3%. It nevertheless generates the same revenues as the
consumption tax (despite its smaller effective rate) because the tax base is higher under a European VAT. Revenues
from the European VAT and from the consumption tax are given by
(
τvt /
(
1 + τvt
))
PtCt and τct PtCt respectively
(see (33)). That is, effective tax rates ( τ
v
t
1+τv
t
and τct ) are multiplied by the tax base PtCt. Substituting (23),
PtCt can be written as (1 + ξt)P fint Ct. While P
fin
t and Ct are the same in both model versions, the aggregate
markup ξt is higher in the steady state of the European VAT model, because retail firms use it to roll over the
tax burden to consumers.
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Table 1: Baseline parameters
Parameter Value Motivation / target
β Discount factor 0.99 Annual risk-free rate of 4%
γ Relative risk aversion 1 Log-utility
φ−1 Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1 Kimball (2008)
 Elasticity of substitution goods varieties 10 11% price markup, Basu (1997)
w Elasticity of substitution types of labor 7.4 15% wage markup, Chari et al. 2002
θ Calvo probability firms 0.6875 Avg. lifetime 9.6 months, Druant et al. 2009
θw Calvo probability unions 0.76 Avg. lifetime 12.5 months, Druant et al. 2009
αpi Inflation coefficient in Taylor Rule 1.5 Standard
n Weight of home country in Taylor Rule 0.01 Passive monetary policy
ω Steady state import share 0.33 Evers (2012)
τv Steady state tax rate European VAT model 20% (0%) Eurozone avg., Lipinska & Von Thadden (2012)
τ c Steady state tax rate cons. tax model 21.3% (0%) Same revenues as in European VAT model
G Government spending 0.165 Balanced budget in steady state
θr Calvo probability of retail firms 0.75 Avg. lifetime markup: 1 year
r Substitution elasticity retail varieties 30 Retailers’ profits 20% of total profits
of steady state GDP) is chosen such that it equals the revenues from the respective tax in the
steady state. As robustness exercise, we also consider a larger government (corresponding to
45% of GDP) that also levies labor taxes.
The elasticity of substitution between retail varieties r = 30 implies that about one fifth of
total profits accrue in the retail sector, in line with data for the US.25 Retail markup rigidity θr
is 0.75 in the baseline calibration, implying an average lifetime of a markup of one year. The
resulting pass-through dynamics are discussed in the following subsection.
3.8 Model pass-through
This section illustrates tax pass-through in the two model versions. Figure 2 shows pass-through
of the VAT as well as the implicit pass-through when the VAT is represented by a consumption
tax. Analog to Benedek et al. (2015), the cumulative pass-through at a given time after a VAT
change is defined as the cumulative proportionate response of consumer prices to an increase
in the respective tax factor.26 The upper (lower) panel depicts pass-through for an anticipated
(unanticipated) tax increase by 1% of steady state GDP. Horizontal axes denote time in quarters,
and both policies are implemented in t=0. For the anticipated reform, the two-year time window
shown in Figure 2 begins at the time of the announcement in t=-4, while it begins at the time
of the implementation for the unanticipated reform.
25Using different values of r is virtually irrelevant for the model’s adjustment properties. The calibration data
comes from the 2014 National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
which provides corporate profits by industry. Retail trade and wholesale trade (both sectors that distribute final
goods) make about one fifth of total profits of non-financial firms.
26Formally, cumulative pass-through after t periods is given by P
cpi
t
−Pcpi
Pcpi
/ τt−τ1+τ , where τ is the respective tax
rate (either τc or τv), and P cpit = (1 + τct )Pt = (1 + τct )(1 + ξt)P
fin
t corresponds in both model versions to the
CPI. Steady state values have no time subscript.
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Figure 2: Cumulative pass-through in both models.
In the consumption tax model, changes in τ ct directly enter consumer prices (see budget (2)),
so the implicit full pass-through subsides only due to general equilibrium price adjustments.
However, as we can see in the lower panel, this happens only slowly, because price adjustments
are mitigated by price and wage rigidity. Recall that the only purpose of the consumption tax
is to represent the implementation of the VAT in standard models. It is thus not claimed that
its pass-through is realistic for any kind of consumption tax.
In the European VAT model, in contrast, changes in τvt affect the CPI only via adjustments
in the aggregate markup ξt. Since the latter is sticky and set by forward-looking retail firms (see
Section 3.2.3), we observe a gradual pass-through and significant anticipation effects (in line with
Carare & Danninger (2008), see Section 2). The model pass-through corresponds to the estimate
by Benedek et al. (2015): Figure 3 is taken from that study and shows the cumulative VAT pass-
through (measured as in Figure 2) for an estimation that includes all VAT changes in their sample.
Comparing the upper panel of Figure 2 with Figure 3 shows that VAT pass-through in the model
is broadly in line with the upper end of the 95% confidence interval of the estimate.27 Targeting
the upper end of the confidence interval makes the parametrization conservative because a weaker
pass-through would further reduce short-run multipliers and thereby enlarge differences to their
values in the consumption tax model.28
Pass-through in either model version converges to roughly 80% in the long run, and differ-
ences between pass-through dynamics are only significant for about two years after a tax change
(recognizable in the lower panel of Figure 2). This is desirable for the sake of conservative mod-
eling, because reliable empirical evidence of partial pass-through exists only for the short-run
after a VAT change: The studies mentioned in Section 2 typically document pass-through in a
time window ending one or two years after a VAT change, while no study explicitly addresses
pass-through in the long run.29 We therefore only deviate from the (implicit) pass-through dy-
27The anticipated VAT change is the suitable exercise for a comparison because Benedek et al. (2015) estimate
pass-through in the period from one year prior to a VAT change to one year thereafter.
28The main results are reported for different variations of pass-through dynamics.
29This is not surprising, since it is easier to attribute price changes to a recent VAT change than to a VAT
change that occurred long ago.
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namics in the institutions’ models when it is supported by strong empirical evidence, that is, in
the short-run after a VAT change.
Figure 3: Estimated cumulative pass-through in the Eurozone. Source: Benedek et al. (2015).
4 Dissecting multipliers
This section builds the economic intuition for differences in multipliers between both model ver-
sions. We consider an exemplary fiscal consolidation exercise in which the respective tax rate
(τ ct or τvt ) increases exogenously such that quarterly tax revenues rise by 0.25% of steady state
GDP for three years, and the additional revenues are used to buy assets.30 Both model versions
are considered separately. The following impulse responses were obtained using a standard per-
turbation method in Dynare and depict tax rates, interest rates and inflation rates in annualized
units.
4.1 Consumption tax model
Figure 4 shows the impact of the exemplary fiscal consolidation when it is implemented by a
higher consumption tax – which represents the impact of a VAT increase in standard models.
Since the tax base (consumption) is smaller than output in the steady state (due to the public
sector), the tax rate has to increase by about 1.4% to elevate revenues by 1% of steady state GDP
(1,4)31. Since the government lends additional revenues back to households, the tax hike ceteris
paribus does not affect households’ financial means. In the course of the adjustment, households
reduce consumption by about 0.22% of steady state GDP (1,1). This only lowers aggregate
demand and output by roughly 0.15%, because households also reduce imports (1,2) and because
government consumption is constant. The overhang of the reduction in consumption expenditures
over the reduction in income is lent to foreign households and leads to an accumulation of foreign
bond holdings (1,3).
The nominal rate (not shown) is virtually constant due to the home country’s small weight in
the union. In line with the institutions’ models, intermediate good prices are very stable (2,1),
because wages paid by firms (3,3) – and thereby marginal costs (3,2) – are remarkably steady
30As argued in Section 3.4, we would obtain the same multipliers for fiscal stimulus.
31Parentheses indicate the relevant panel. They read as (row, column).
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due to nominal wage rigidity.32 The adjustment of the real interest rate is thus dominated by
changes in the consumption tax, and exhibits a sharp peak in period 12 when the tax rate reverts
to its initial level (2,2). This corresponds to an increase in the long real rate already at the onset
of the consolidation (2,2), and explains the immediate decline in consumption (1,1). Intuitively,
households anticipate that consumer prices will drop when the fiscal consolidation comes to an
end and postpone consumption until then.
A further consequence of the small adjustment in intermediate goods prices is that the depre-
ciation in the terms of trade (2,3), and the resulting expenditure switching (1,2), is negligible.
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Figure 4: Three-year consolidation in the consumption tax model.
4.2 European VAT model
Figure 5 depicts the adjustment to the fiscal consolidation in the European VAT model. To
facilitate a comparison with the consumption tax model, the adjustment in the latter is replicated
32Flexible wages are examined in the robustness analysis. A further reason for the mild wage adjustment is that
the MRS (3,1) declines in line with effective real wages (accounting for the consumption tax) (3,3). (Effective real
wages decline for a given nominal wage due to the hike in the consumption tax, while the MRS drops because of
lower consumption and hours.) As a result, no substantial adjustment of nominal wages is required in order to
maintain the optimal proportion w
w−1 between effective real wages and the MRS.
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in dashed blue lines (and with circles as markers). As in the consumption tax model, the tax
rate has to rise by about 1.4% to improve the primary balance by 1% of steady state GDP
(1,4). We begin by examining the aggregate retail markup, which increases as retailers roll over
the additional tax liability to consumers (3,4). It peaks roughly two years after the VAT hike
sets in (in t=8), but its deviation remains below the deviation of the tax factor throughout the
adjustment. The aggregate markup is still elevated after five years, i.e. for two more years after
the tax hike has ended. This is because Calvo-rigidity forbids some retailers who increased their
markup during the time of the tax hike to undo this action as soon as the policy comes to an
end. The peak occurs at t=8 because some retailers begin to lower their markup in anticipation
of the near reversal of the tax rate in t=12.
As in the previous exercise, inflation in intermediate good prices is very weak (2,1), so CPI
inflation is dominated by inflation in retailer markups.33 Since the nominal rate is virtually
constant, the deviation of the real rate (2,2) mirrors CPI inflation and is negative when the
aggregate retail markup rises (until t=8), and positive when it reverts downward. This gives
rise to the observed hump-shaped deviation of the long-term real rate (2,2), which is a forward-
looking average of one-period real rates. From the standard Euler equation, consumption adjusts
accordingly (1,1).
In both model versions, households reduce consumption because the fiscal consolidation causes
a transitory increase in consumer prices – either directly via a higher consumption tax or indi-
rectly via higher retail markups. However, the short-run decline of consumption is dramatically
weaker in the European VAT model. The reason is that markup rigidity prevents retailers to
instantaneously roll over the full increment in the tax liability to consumer prices, whereas it
directly falls on consumer prices in the consumption tax model. The second difference between
consumption adjustment in both models is that the European VAT model predicts a gradual
reversal of consumption to its initial level – lasting beyond the reversal of the tax hike – and
not, as the consumption tax model, a jump that occurs at the moment when the tax hike ends.
This is because consumer price changes caused by adjustments in retail markups exhibit inertia
(since markups are Calvo-sticky), which does not apply for consumer price changes driven by a
change in consumption taxes.
33It is not surprising that retail firms carry out the lion’s share of the nominal adjustment, as they are directly
affected by the change in the tax rate.
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Figure 5: 3-year consolidation in the European VAT model.
5 Comparing multipliers
This section systematically compares multipliers across both models. Multipliers are derived for
consolidations of various durations, and under various calibrations of pass-through dynamics in
the European VAT model. In particular, Table 2 considers four different fiscal consolidation
scenarios, which improve the primary balance by 1% of steady state GDP for one, two, five,
and 20 years respectively.34 The following multiplier statistics are computed: impact multiplier
(percentage change of GDP when the VAT hike sets in), peak multiplier (peak percentage devi-
ation of GDP), as well as average multipliers for one, two, five, and 20 years (average percentage
deviations of GDP). In addition, the table reports the average GDP adjustment during the
time from the beginning of the consolidation until two years after it has ended (last column).35
Statistics are computed for the consumption tax model, as well as for the European VAT model
in the following six calibrations of retail markup setting: for the rigidity parameter θr, values
34The 20-year consolidation symbolizes a permanent VAT hike.
35This statistic is not a multiplier in the strict sense, because periods succeeding the consolidation are included
in the average. It is nevertheless useful to measure the total impact of a consolidation, which requires to account
for the sustained GDP decline in the European VAT model (that persists after the consolidation ended, see Figure
5), as well as for the modest post-consolidation expansion of GDP in the consumption tax model (see Figure 4).
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0.67, 0.75 (baseline), and 0.85 are considered, while we use 0.85 and 0.99 (baseline) for the time-
discount factor βr.36 The table also provides statistics to quantify pass-through dynamics for the
respective calibration of θr and βr: columns one, two, and three respectively show the instanta-
neous pass-through, as well as cumulative pass-through after one and two years.37 To facilitate
the comparison of multipliers between both model versions, parentheses next to European VAT
multipliers report the percentage difference to their value in the consumption tax model.
Table 2: VAT multipliers in both model versions
Cumulative PT Impact Peak Average multipliers Avg. adjustment
impact 1 year 2 years multiplier multiplier 1 year 2 years 5 years 20 years duration +2 yrs.
One-year consolidation
Cons. tax model 100% 98% – 0.16 0.16 0.15 – – – -0.05
θr = 0.67 βr=0.85 29% 49% – 0.05 (-71%) 0.08 (-48%) 0.07 (-55%) – – – -0.03 (-32%)
— βr=0.99 26% 41% – 0.04 (-73%) 0.07 (-55%) 0.06 (-61%) – – – -0.03 (-41%)
θr = 0.75 βr=0.85 20% 38% – 0.03 (-80%) 0.06 (-61%) 0.05 (-67%) – – – -0.03 (-42%)
— βr=0.99 17% 29% – 0.03 (-83%) 0.05 (-69%) 0.04 (-73%) – – – -0.02 (-54%)
θr = 0.85 βr=0.85 10% 22% – 0.02 (-90%) 0.03 (-78%) 0.03 (-82%) – – – -0.02 (-60%)
— βr=0.99 7% 14% – 0.01 (-93%) 0.02 (-86%) 0.02 (-88%) – – – -0.01 (-74%)
Two-year consolidation
Cons. tax model 99% 95% 95% 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 – – -0.06
θr = 0.67 βr=0.85 31% 73% 60% 0.05 (-69%) 0.11 (-26%) 0.08 (-43%) 0.09 (-34%) – – -0.05 (-18%)
— βr=0.99 30% 69% 52% 0.05 (-70%) 0.11 (-31%) 0.08 (-45%) 0.09 (-38%) – – -0.05 (-25%)
θr = 0.75 βr=0.85 23% 59% 54% 0.03 (-78%) 0.10 (-38%) 0.06 (-56%) 0.08 (-46%) – – -0.05 (-26%)
— βr=0.99 21% 53% 44% 0.03 (-79%) 0.08 (-46%) 0.06 (-59%) 0.07 (-52%) – – -0.04 (-36%)
θr = 0.85 βr=0.85 13% 38% 41% 0.02 (-88%) 0.06 (-58%) 0.04 (-74%) 0.05 (-65%) – – -0.04 (-43%)
— βr=0.99 10% 29% 28% 0.02 (-90%) 0.05 (-70%) 0.03 (-79%) 0.04 (-74%) – – -0.03 (-58%)
Five-year consolidation
Cons. tax model 99% 92% 87% 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 – -0.08
θr = 0.67 βr=0.85 31% 72% 83% 0.04 (-71%) 0.11 (-26%) 0.08 (-44%) 0.09 (-27%) 0.10 (-15%) – -0.07 (-8%)
— βr=0.99 31% 72% 83% 0.04 (-71%) 0.11 (-25%) 0.08 (-44%) 0.09 (-26%) 0.10 (-17%) – -0.07 (-11%)
θr = 0.75 βr=0.85 23% 61% 78% 0.03 (-80%) 0.10 (-29%) 0.06 (-56%) 0.08 (-38%) 0.09 (-22%) – -0.07 (-12%)
— βr=0.99 23% 60% 77% 0.03 (-79%) 0.10 (-30%) 0.06 (-56%) 0.08 (-38%) 0.09 (-25%) – -0.06 (-17%)
θr = 0.85 βr=0.85 13% 41% 61% 0.02 (-89%) 0.09 (-38%) 0.04 (-73%) 0.05 (-57%) 0.07 (-37%) – -0.06 (-22%)
— βr=0.99 13% 40% 58% 0.02 (-89%) 0.08 (-45%) 0.04 (-74%) 0.05 (-58%) 0.07 (-44%) – -0.05 (-32%)
20-year consolidation
Cons. tax model 99% 93% 88% 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 -0.08
θr = 0.67 βr=0.85 31% 74% 85% 0.03 (-77%) 0.10 (-25%) 0.07 (-47%) 0.08 (-28%) 0.09 (-11%) 0.09 (-3%) -0.08 (-1%)
— βr=0.99 32% 74% 85% 0.03 (-76%) 0.10 (-25%) 0.07 (-47%) 0.08 (-28%) 0.09 (-12%) 0.09 (-4%) -0.08 (-2%)
θr = 0.75 βr=0.85 23% 63% 80% 0.02 (-86%) 0.10 (-29%) 0.05 (-60%) 0.07 (-40%) 0.08 (-17%) 0.09 (-6%) -0.08 (-2%)
— βr=0.99 23% 63% 80% 0.02 (-86%) 0.10 (-29%) 0.05 (-60%) 0.07 (-40%) 0.08 (-18%) 0.08 (-7%) -0.08 (-4%)
θr = 0.85 βr=0.85 14% 44% 65% 0.01 (-96%) 0.09 (-33%) 0.03 (-78%) 0.05 (-60%) 0.07 (-31%) 0.08 (-10%) -0.08 (-5%)
— βr=0.99 14% 44% 64% 0.01 (-96%) 0.09 (-36%) 0.03 (-78%) 0.05 (-60%) 0.07 (-31%) 0.08 (-12%) -0.07 (-8%)
Before we consider the different calibrations of pass-through dynamics, we discuss two main
insights of Table 2. First, regardless of a consolidation’s duration, short-run multipliers (i.e.
impact multipliers and one-year and two-year average multipliers) are dramatically smaller in
the European VAT model. The explanation directly follows from the discussion in Section
4: delay in the pass-through dampens the short-run GDP adjustment because it defers the
incentive to postpone consumption. Second, multipliers averaging over the entire duration of a
36Time-discounting specific to the retail sector is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
37As in Section 3.8, pass-through is defined as cumulative proportionate response of consumer prices to an
increase in the VAT tax factor.
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consolidation (as well as the average GDP decline reported in the last column) are also smaller in
the European VAT model, but differences become weaker in a consolidation’s duration. For short
consolidations, retail firms anticipate the near reversal of the tax rate already at the onset of
the policy. This weakens the incentive to raise markups, which dampens total tax pass-through
and thereby the present value of the decline in output. These anticipation effects become weaker
in the duration of a consolidation, and they play a minor role for the five-year and 20-year
consolidation. For these consolidations, differences in long-run multipliers are driven by the fact
that the adjustment in both models is virtually identical once pass-through has converged to 80%
in both model versions (see Section 3.8). The weight of the early phase – when the adjustment is
different between both models – is smaller for multipliers that average over a longer time horizon.
Regarding the different calibrations of markup rigidity, we observe that βr is of minor impor-
tance for multipliers. For θr, we find that more rigidity in the markup (a higher value) increases
the differences in multipliers. The explanation is straightforward: differences are driven by de-
layed tax pass-through in the European VAT model, and this delay becomes stronger in the
degree of markup rigidity.
The general picture is that differences between both models are striking for impact multipliers,
one-year and two-year average multipliers, and peak multipliers. By and large, incorporating re-
alistic pass-through dynamics reduces the first-year (two-year) average GDP decline by roughly
50%-80% (30%-60%), relative to the projections in the model that implements the VAT as a
consumption tax paid by households. Even for the weakest calibration of retail markup rigid-
ity (θr = 0.67, corresponding to an expected markup lifetime of three quarters), the first-year
multiplier declines by at least 45%. Since this calibration of VAT pass-through is extremely
conservative – in the sense that it overstates VAT pass-through38 and thereby understates differ-
ences in multipliers – the results strongly suggest that neglecting pass-through dynamics leads
to a severe overestimation of the short-tun impact of VAT changes.
6 Policy implications
Overestimation of the short-run impact of VAT changes in workhorse models used at policy-
making institutions can significantly affect policy advice derived from those models. As example,
consider Coenen et al. (2008), who apply the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) to analyze
fiscal consolidation strategies that reduce the debt ratio in the euro area from 70% to 60%.
Figure 6 is taken from the paper and compares the impact of increasing labor income taxes with
the impact of increasing consumption taxes, which represent the VAT.
38θr = 0.67 implies a more comprehensive short-run pass-through than the baseline calibration, for which tax
pass-through is already stronger than what is estimated by Benedek et al. (2015) (see Section 3.8).
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Figure 6: Impact of a fiscal consolidation in Coenen et al. (2008)
In the first eight quarters following the tax hike, the consumption tax (the stand-in for the
VAT) has a significantly stronger adverse impact on output than the labor income tax (right
panel). This can weaken the case for the use of the VAT as fiscal instrument, especially for
countries that are in severe recession. However, the results of the paper at hand suggest that
the short-run impact of the VAT hike would be significantly weaker if the NAWM accounted
for empirically plausible VAT pass-through. This would presumably make the VAT the superior
fiscal instrument also in the short run, and thereby allow for a more clear-cut policy advice.
The findings of this paper are also potentially relevant for the quantification of the impact of
fiscal devaluations in theoretical models. Since the literature treats the VAT as a consumption
tax (see Lipinska & Von Thadden, 2012; Hohberger & Kraus, 2016, Engler et al.,forthcoming),
the VAT increase that is part of a fiscal consolidation has an immediate negative impact on
private consumption. Under empirically plausible pass-through dynamics this impact would be
significantly weaker, and the stimulus from a fiscal devaluation would presumably be stronger.
Finally, the results of this paper are important for the choice between using the standard
VAT rate or reduced VAT rates as fiscal instrument. Benedek et al. (2015) report that tax pass-
through is considerably faster and more comprehensive for the standard rate than for reduced
rates. In light of the findings of this paper, reduced rates appear thus more suitable for fiscal
consolidation, as they can be expected to have a weaker adverse impact on economic activity in
the short run. By the same token, the standard rate is more appropriate to be lowered in order
to stimulate the economy: as the benefit is more quickly passed on to consumers, the induced
GDP expansion is stronger in the short run.
7 Robustness analysis
To examine the robustness of the results, Tables 3 and 4 (p. 26 and p. 27 in the appendix) report
the same statistics as Table 2, but for variations in parameters and in the model specification.
Rows labeled “European VAT model” depict the results for the baseline parameters θr = 0.75
and βr = 0.99. As in Table 2, parentheses indicate the percentage difference between multipliers
in both models.
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7.1 Exercise A: Introducing Rule-of-Thumb households
In this exercise, 40% of households are credit-constrained “Rule-of-Thumb” consumers, intro-
duced by Galí et al. (2004).39 This in general increases multipliers and also slightly raises their
differences across the two models. The reason is that changes in disposable income of Rule-of-
Thumb households translate to their full extent into changes in consumption. The reduction in
hours worked and labor income induced by the consolidation thus lead to a further decline in
Rule-of-Thumb consumption, and the emerging adverse feedback loop increases multipliers.
7.2 Exercise B: Flexible wages
To obtain wage flexibility, the rigidity parameter of wages θw (see equation (31)) is set to a
negligibly small value, which slightly reduces the overall size of multipliers. Under wage flexibility,
nominal wages decline in the short-run as response to the fall in the MRS between consumption
and leisure. This reduction in marginal costs leads to lower producer prices. The latter stabilizes
output in the face of the consolidation, because it offsets some of the increase in consumer prices
(the driver of the reduction in consumption), and because the implied deterioration in the terms
of trade induces more export demand. However, the implications for the differences in multipliers
between both model versions are very modest.
7.3 Exercise C: Weaker elasticity of intertemporal substitution
This exercise considers γ = 2 instead of γ = 1 in the utility function (1), which lowers the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We observe that multipliers are significantly smaller,
but differences between both model versions decrease only slightly. The reason why multipliers
are smaller is that weaker intertemporal substitution dampens the main channel by which the
consolidation affects output – the postponement of consumption until the tax hike is over.
7.4 Exercise D: Larger public sector and labor taxes
As of 2014, general government expenditure as share of GDP is on average as high as 49% in the
Euro Area (source: Eurostat). To replicate this figure, the model is extended by a constant labor
tax rate of 32%, and government consumption G is increased by the amount of the additional
revenues.40 This has a mild impact on the level of multipliers in both model versions, but does
not significantly change differences between both models.
7.5 Exercise E and F: Higher country weights in Taylor Rule
The baseline value n = 0.01 roughly matches the 2016 HICP country weights of Ireland, Greece
and Portugal (1.4%, 2.4% and 2.2% respectively) and implies that the home country has a
negligible weight in the union-wide inflation measure. Hence there is no significant reaction of
monetary policy to inflation in the home country. To study the implications of higher country
weights, exercise E considers n = 0.11 (which is in line with the HICP weight of Spain), and
exercise F uses n = 0.2 (which roughly corresponds the weight of Italy and France, 17.6% and
20.7% respectively).41 We observe that a higher country weight leads to smaller multipliers. To
39The model description is available upon request.
40The model description is available upon request.
41All of these countries have a high debt-to-GDP ratio. In 2015, it is 93.8% in Ireland, 176.9% in Greece, 129%
in Portugal, 99.2% in Spain, 132.7% in Italy, and 95.8% in France. Source: Eurostat.
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see why, recall that the decline in consumption is driven by the positive deviation of the long-
term real rate from the onset of the consolidation, and that this deviation results from the fall
in consumer prices when the consolidation comes to an end. Responsive monetary policy means
that this downward-reversion of consumer prices goes along with a decline in the nominal rate,
which dampens the positive deviation in the real rate. Regarding the differences in multipliers
between both model versions, a higher value of n does not significantly affect the results.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the implications of empirically plausible tax pass-through dynamics for
VAT multipliers. The focus on tax pass-through is motivated by the fact that standard models
in academic research as well as workhorse models of leading policy-making institutions implement
the VAT as a consumption tax, which dramatically exaggerates the speed of VAT pass-through. I
use a standard DSGE model to quantify the resulting bias in short-run VAT multipliers, which is
defined as as the difference between multipliers when the VAT is implemented as a consumption
tax and multipliers when the VAT is thoroughly modeled in the sense that it has realistic pass-
through dynamics. The analysis shows that the standard modeling strategy greatly overestimates
the short-run impact of VAT changes: depending on the duration of the discretionary fiscal
policy, one-year average multipliers and two-year average multipliers decline by about 50%-80%
and 30%-60% respectively once the model accounts for realistic VAT pass-through.
In doing so, this paper proposes a modeling strategy that allows to align VAT pass-through
with empirical estimates. Provided that a model features country-specific pricing equations, a
technically inexpensive alternative to the proposed strategy is to implement the VAT as a tax
paid by intermediate good firms on their sales (discussed at the end of Section 3.2.1).42 This
would make the model substantially better suited to derive tax multipliers for countries that use
a European-style VAT rather than a US-style sales tax.
Since the relative size of multipliers associated with different fiscal instruments is crucial
for the design of discretionary fiscal policy packages, the accuracy of VAT multipliers obtained
from theoretical models is highly relevant for policy advice. This is particularly true on the
backdrop of the high debt levels in many developed countries, which make it necessary to assess
alternative fiscal consolidation strategies. The results of this paper also draw attention to the
distinction between the VAT standard rate and VAT reduced rates as fiscal instruments. Since
both are reported to differ in their pass-through dynamics, a more thorough analysis of their
suitability as instrument for macroeconomic stabilization is a promising direction for further
research. Finally, revisiting the implementation of the VAT could potentially overturn the results
from the theoretical literature on the effectiveness of fiscal devaluations.
42If the Calvo-parameter for intermediate good firms equals the Calvo-parameter for retailers (θr = θ), the model
at hand generates the pass-through dynamics that one would obtain under the alternative modeling strategy. Since
the standard Calvo-parameter 0.75 for retail markup rigidity leads to empirically plausible pass-through dynamics
(see Section 3.8), the alternative modeling strategy would constitute a significant improvement on the standard
approach.
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Appendix
Table 3: Robustness analysis (1/2)
Impact Peak Average multipliers Avg. adjustment
multiplier multiplier 1 year 2 years 5 years 20 years duration +2 yrs.
Baseline model (for comparison)
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.16 0.16 0.15 – – – -0.05
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-83%) 0.05 (-69%) 0.04 (-73%) – – – -0.02 (-54%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 – – -0.06
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-79%) 0.08 (-46%) 0.06 (-59%) 0.07 (-52%) – – -0.04 (-36%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 – -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-79%) 0.10 (-30%) 0.06 (-56%) 0.08 (-38%) 0.09 (-25%) – -0.06 (-17%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-86%) 0.10 (-29%) 0.05 (-60%) 0.07 (-40%) 0.08 (-18%) 0.08 (-7%) -0.08 (-4%)
Exercise A: Including Rule-of-thumb consumers
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.20 0.20 0.20 – – – -0.06
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-83%) 0.06 (-71%) 0.05 (-75%) – – – -0.03 (-57%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 – – -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.04 (-79%) 0.10 (-50%) 0.07 (-60%) 0.08 (-54%) – – -0.05 (-38%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 – -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.04 (-79%) 0.11 (-41%) 0.07 (-57%) 0.09 (-39%) 0.10 (-27%) – -0.07 (-18%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.09 -0.09
—- Euro. VAT model 0.04 (-80%) 0.12 (-37%) 0.07 (-58%) 0.09 (-41%) 0.09 (-20%) 0.09 (-8%) -0.09 (-4%)
Exercise B: Flexible wages
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.12 0.12 0.11 – – – -0.03
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-85%) 0.03 (-74%) 0.03 (-75%) – – – -0.01 (-56%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 – – -0.04
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-81%) 0.05 (-55%) 0.04 (-59%) 0.04 (-53%) – – -0.03 (-36%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 – -0.06
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-81%) 0.07 (-36%) 0.04 (-55%) 0.05 (-36%) 0.06 (-24%) – -0.05 (-16%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-82%) 0.08 (-25%) 0.04 (-53%) 0.06 (-34%) 0.07 (-14%) 0.08 (-5%) -0.07 (-2%)
Exercise C: Weaker elasticity of intertemporal substitution
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.07 0.07 0.07 – – – -0.02
—- Euro. VAT model 0.01 (-82%) 0.02 (-67%) 0.02 (-72%) – – – -0.01 (-52%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 – – -0.03
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-77%) 0.04 (-42%) 0.03 (-56%) 0.03 (-49%) – – -0.02 (-33%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 – -0.04
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-77%) 0.05 (-24%) 0.03 (-52%) 0.04 (-34%) 0.04 (-22%) – -0.03 (-14%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04
—- Euro. VAT model 0.01 (-80%) 0.05 (-22%) 0.03 (-54%) 0.04 (-35%) 0.04 (-14%) 0.04 (-4%) -0.04 (-1%)
Exercise D: Larger public sector and payroll taxes
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.13 0.13 0.13 – – – -0.04
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-83%) 0.04 (-68%) 0.04 (-73%) – – – -0.02 (-53%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 – – -0.06
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-78%) 0.08 (-42%) 0.05 (-58%) 0.06 (-51%) – – -0.04 (-35%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 – -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-77%) 0.11 (-16%) 0.06 (-53%) 0.08 (-36%) 0.09 (-24%) – -0.07 (-16%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.10
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-82%) 0.11 (-12%) 0.05 (-55%) 0.07 (-36%) 0.09 (-16%) 0.10 (-8%) -0.09 (-6%)
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Table 4: Robustness analysis (2/2)
Impact Peak Average multipliers Avg. adjustment
multiplier multiplier 1 year 2 years 5 years 20 years duration +2 yrs.
Baseline model (for comparison)
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.16 0.16 0.15 – – – -0.05
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-83%) 0.05 (-69%) 0.04 (-73%) – – – -0.02 (-54%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 – – -0.06
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-79%) 0.08 (-46%) 0.06 (-59%) 0.07 (-52%) – – -0.04 (-36%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 – -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-79%) 0.10 (-30%) 0.06 (-56%) 0.08 (-38%) 0.09 (-25%) – -0.06 (-17%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.02 (-86%) 0.10 (-29%) 0.05 (-60%) 0.07 (-40%) 0.08 (-18%) 0.08 (-7%) -0.08 (-4%)
Exercise E: 11% weight and different inflation measure
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.16 0.16 0.13 – – – -0.04
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-83%) 0.04 (-73%) 0.04 (-73%) – – – -0.02 (-53%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.13 – – -0.06
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-78%) 0.07 (-52%) 0.06 (-57%) 0.06 (-51%) – – -0.04 (-35%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.11 – -0.07
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-78%) 0.10 (-35%) 0.06 (-53%) 0.08 (-35%) 0.08 (-24%) – -0.06 (-15%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.08
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-82%) 0.09 (-34%) 0.05 (-55%) 0.07 (-36%) 0.08 (-16%) 0.09 (-6%) -0.08 (-3%)
Exercise F: 20% weight and different inflation measure
One year duration Cons. tax model 0.16 0.16 0.12 – – – -0.04
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-83%) 0.04 (-77%) 0.03 (-72%) – – – -0.02 (-52%)
Two years duration Cons. tax model 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.11 – – -0.05
—- Euro. VAT model 0.04 (-78%) 0.07 (-58%) 0.05 (-55%) 0.06 (-50%) – – -0.03 (-34%)
Five years duration Cons. tax model 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.10 – -0.07
—- Euro. VAT model 0.04 (-77%) 0.09 (-40%) 0.06 (-50%) 0.07 (-33%) 0.08 (-23%) – -0.06 (-14%)
20 years duration Cons. tax model 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.09
—- Euro. VAT model 0.03 (-79%) 0.10 (-34%) 0.05 (-51%) 0.07 (-33%) 0.08 (-14%) 0.09 (-5%) -0.09 (-3%)
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